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In 1866 Members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction introduced
the Fourteenth Amendment into the House of Representatives and the Senate,
respectively. Several speakers indicated that the force of the new amendment
would be to protect basic or fundamental citizen rights against adverse action
by state governments and would allow Congress for the first time to protect such
rights against such state action. One speaker in the House, John Bingham, who
had written Section One of the amendment, indicated that among the
protected “privileges or immunities of citizens” were those rights listed in the first
eight amendments to the Constitution, rights that previously had been
enforceable only against Congress, not against state governments. He
specifically cited the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments by way of example.1 In the U.S. Senate it was Sen. Jacob Howard
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CONG.GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess 1088-1095 (Feb.3, 1866); 2542-3
(May 8, 1866). Rep. Bingham makes clear his understanding that
the Fourteenth Amendment would apply the privileges listed in
the Bill of Rights against state governments by stating that the
amendment would overturn Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243
(1833), the case that had established the contrary rule. Four
years later, Bingham had occasion to discuss the Amendment again
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who introduced the Amendment, and he explained that the “views and
motives that had influenced the Joint Committee” in proposing the Amendment
included the goal of protecting against state governmental abridgment “the
personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution.”2 This speech received detailed coverage and was featured
prominently on page one or two of major newspapers all over the U.S. 3 In the
ensuing debates over adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, no one questioned
the claims that the amendment would incorporate against the states the rights
listed in the first eight amendments, but many speakers referred in more general

on the floor and at this time he said he had specifically reworded the Amendment in order to make clear that it secured “the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States,
which are defined in the eight articles of amendment.” CONG
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1871).
2

3

CONG.GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess 2765-6 (May 23, 1866).

Stephen Halbrook lists the following newspapers as giving
extensive quotation or detailed first or second page coverage to
the Howard speech, less than a month before the Amendment went
to the states for ratification: New York Times, New York Herald,
National Intelligencer, Philadelphia Inquirer, Chicago Tribune,
Baltimore Gazette, Boston Daily Journal, Boston Daily
Advertiser, Springfield Daily Republican, Richmond Daily
Examiner, Charleston Daily Courier. Senator Howard’s speech
stated that the import of the privileges and immunities clause
was incorporation of the personal rights listed in the first
eight amendments against state governments and the
constitutionalizing of the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866. Stephen P. Halbrook, Freedmen, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Right to Bear Arms, 1866-1876 (Praeger,
1998), 36.
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terms to those rights that were fundamental to members of a free society.4
The U.S. Supreme Court decision that first set forth an interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment was the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873).5 It presents a
number of mysteries:
1) If it is correct that the Republican 39th Congress, which wrote the Fourteenth
Amendment, intended its Privileges or Immunities Clause to incorporate
fundamental civil rights and liberties against state governmental abridgment
and was widely thus understood--so widely that the Supreme Court had to have
been aware of it-- and if it is also correct that the Slaughterhouse majority turned
its back on that clause,6 why would a Supreme Court made up of 7/9
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David Bogen, “Slaughterhouse Five: Views of the Case,” 55
(Dec.2003) Hastings Law Journal 333-398.
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Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (10 Wall.) 36 (1873).

There is an enormous literature on the Fourteenth Amendment.
The modern scholarly consensus reads the intent of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as incorporating against state
government the individual liberties of the first eight
amendments of the Bill of Rights. John Hart Ely, Democracy and
Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 22-30 (1980)(interpreting
the Congressional debates as manifesting an intent to
incorporate the Bill of Rights plus other fundamental rights);
Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights (Durham: Duke University Press,
1986); “Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and
Revising the Slaughterhouse Cases without Exhuming Lochner:
Individual Rights and the 14th Amendment,” 38 (1996) Boston Coll.
L. Rev. 1-106 ; Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution,
and Congress, 1863-1869, at 113-18 (1990); Richard L. Aynes,
“Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases,” 70 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev.
627 (1994); Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1998); Akhil Reed
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Amar, “The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment,” 101
Yale L.J. 1193 (2000); Laurence H. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law 7-6, at 1320-31 (3d ed. 1999); William
Winslow Crosskey, “Charles Fairman, ‘Legislative History,’ and
the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority,” 22 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1, 2-119 (1954); dissent of Justice Black in Adamson,
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947). For the view that was prevalent from
1947 until the mid-nineteen eighties, cf. Charles Fairman, “Does
the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding,” 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949). For many
years, Raoul Berger carried on the anti-incorporation argument
of Charles Fairman, e.g, Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights 8, 141 (1989). See also, Pamela
Brandwein, Reconstructing Reconstruction (Duke University Press,
1999), surveying the course of these “dueling histories.” Even
the “anti-incorporation” school, as represented by Fairman and
Berger, acknowledged that everyone in Congress seemed to
understand that the Fourteenth Amendment would have the force of
declaring a wide range of civil rights fundamental as a federal
matter, and therefore unabridgable by the states and enforceable
by Congress. In other words, both sides see Miller’s opinion in
the Slaughterhouse Cases as abandoning what Congress understood
as the project of the amendment.
Cf. recent survey of the scholarship on the privileges and
immunities clause, David Bogen, supra note 4 (arguing that
scholarly opinion on its “original intent” shares no consensus
but rather is still divided.) Prof. Bogen acknowledges that
testimony on the floor of the 39th Congress does support
incorporation (because liberties in the Bill of Rights were
“fundamental” ones). Id. at 337-9, 378-381, 392-393. As he puts
it, “[Sponsors] Representative Bingham and Senator Howard
believed that the amendment would make the Bill of Rights
applicable to the states, and no one in Congress specifically
said they were wrong” (id. at 393); “Bingham and Howard said the
Bill of Rights were privileges and immunities” (id. at 380). Yet
he insists, on the side of the critics of a simple incorporation
reading, that this reading cannot come to terms with the fact
that the ratification debates (of which only two are in extant
records) did not discuss incorporation and many of the ratifying
states had laws or constitutional clauses flatly inconsistent
with provisions of the federal Bill of Rights (if it were apply
to state governments) (id. at 380 and 393). He then suggests
that the readings that attempt a way out of this puzzle--either
equal treatment of the races as to fundamental rights, or
absolute incorporation of only the truly fundamental rights,
each runs into criticism as well. Thus, he concludes, there are
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Republican Justices,7 turn its back on this meaning to empty the clause of any
force within only 5 years?8

too many plausible competing accounts of original intent (id. at
384). For this last point he cites William E. Nelson, The
Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial
Doctrine, 123 (1988) and Timothy Bishop, “Comments: The
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: the
Original Intent,” Northwestern University Law Review 79 (March
1984): 142-190.
I disagree with Prof. Bogen on the dispositive significance
of conflicting laws in the ratifying states. A state
representative who, knowing that his state had a conflicting law
on the books, voted to ratify may have simply understood the act
of ratification as wiping that law off the books, or requiring
its modification.
7

Stanley Kutler commented that the Republicans expected from
this Court a “judicial imprimatur for their policies.” Judicial
Power and Reconstruction Politics (University of Chicago Press,
1968), 162. Eight had been appointed by either Lincoln or
Grant. Justice Stephen Field, although appointed by Lincoln, was
nominally a California Democrat. Thus at the time of
Slaughterhouse two of the nine justices (Field and the Buchananappointed, Democratic holdover, Nathan Clifford) had entered the
Court with a Democratic party affiliation. Field and Clifford,
the two Democrats, were to be the two dissenters against the
Court decisions of 1880 that ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment
secured to blacks the right to serve on state and local juries
(see n.22 below) and also against two 1880 decisions that upheld
federal Congressional authority to regulate corrupt behavior of
state officials in Congressional elections (Ex Parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371, and Ex Parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 371, Field
dissenting at 404). (Justice David Davis, who voted in the
Slaughterhouse majority, left the Court in 1877 to serve in the
Senate as an Independent rather than Republican. In 1872 he had
unsuccessfully sought the Presidential nomination of the Liberal
Republicans, so this was his political affiliation around the
time of Slaughterhouse.)

8

That Slaughterhouse effectively nullified the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is a conclusion on which the consensus is
longstanding and overwhelming. Sanford Levinson’s
characterization, for example, of the decision as having
"ruthlessly eviscerated the Clause of practically all operative
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2) In the wake of Saenz v. Roe (1999),9 where Justices Thomas and Rehnquist, in
dissent, called for a re-evaluation of the Slaughterhouse Cases,10 a few scholars
have argued that Slaughterhouse is best read as not having turned its back on
incorporation.11 But if they are right, then how to explain the all but unanimous
decision in U.S. v. Cruikshank,12 where the justices only three years later

meaning" is utterly typical. Sanford Levinson, “Some Reflections
on the Rehabilitation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,” 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 71, 73
(1989).
9

526 U.S. 489 (1999).

10

526 U.S. 489, at 527-8.
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Kevin Christopher Newsom, “Setting Incorporationism Straight:
A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases,” 109 Yale L.J.
643 (2000); Bryan Wildenthal, “The Lost Compromise: Reassessing
the Early Understanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation
of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment,” 61 Ohio St.
L.J. 1051(2000). Earlier suggestions along these lines appeared
in Akhil Reed Amar, “The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment,” supra note 6, at 1258(1992) (suggesting that
Miller’s Slaughterhouse opinion is more ambiguous as to
incorporation than the “conventional reading” of it maintains);
Robert C. Palmer, “The Parameters of Constitutional
Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth
Amendment,” 1984 No. 3 U. Ill. L. Rev. 739 (1984) (struggling to
reconcile an incorporationist reading of Slaughterhouse with
the plainly anti-incorporationist Cruikshank).
12

92 U.S. 542 (1876). To the extent that part of Cruikshank
relies on the companion case of U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1876), it was not unanimous, but that is not central to the
argument here. Also, in Cruikshank, while the judgment that all
the indictments were to be thrown out was unanimous, Justice
Clifford (the lone Democrat on the Court) dissented as to the
reasoning, limiting his concerns to the sloppiness of the
drafting of the indictments. In other words, he did not adhere
to the portion of the Court opinion that rejected incorporation
of the right to bear arms as against state governments. This
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emphatically reject incorporation--specifically, incorporation of First
Amendment rights, for which there is the strongest evidence of original intent in
the incorporationist direction,13 and of Second Amendment rights, for which
there is also more than ample incorporationist evidence—indeed for a specific
motive of incorporation with an eye to giving blacks equal status as members of
the armed citizen militia and the means of self-defense?14
3) If it is correct to read Slaughterhouse as having gutted the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, in such a way as consciously to abandon the former slaves to
the “tender mercies of the very states that had so recently made mincemeat of
them,”15 then why would Justice Miller have made such a fuss in the same

may or may not be related to the fact that white southern Klantype groups were deploying arguments that they were the true
militia of the state and that their right to bear arms in
“defense” of the white citizenry could not be restrained. See
note 44 below.
13

Bogen, supra note 4 at 381, 382; Wildenthal, supra note 11, at
1075 (citing several authorities).
14

Halbrook, supra note 3. Robert J. Cottrol and Raymond T.
Diamond, “The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist
Reconsideration,” 80 (1991) Georgetown Law Journal 309-361, 346.
15
Quote from Curtis, “Resurrecting” the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and Revising the Slaughterhouse Cases without Exhuming
Lochner,” 38 Boston College Law Rev. 1-106, 77. As early as
1878, some legal scholarship had begun to condemn the
Slaughterhouse Cases as a backtracking on the protection of
former slaves that was the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment.
William Royall, “The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughterhouse
Cases” 4 Southern Law Review 558, 576n (1878). See also, Aynes,
“Constricting the Law of Freedom,” supra note 6; Abraham Davis
and Barbara L. Graham, Supreme Court, Race, and Civil Rights
(New York: Sage, 1995), 16 (“For blacks, this interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment meant that protection of their rights
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opinion over the need to read the central message of the Fourteenth
Amendment as providing protection to the newly freed black “from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
him”?16 In other words, was Justice Miller sincere in his description of the core
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment?17 Did he not perceive that his

remained the responsibility of the states that were least likely
to provide that protection.”); Eric Foner, Reconstruction:
America’s Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877 (New York: Harper and
Row, 1988), 529 (noting “Few of these rights [that Miller said
the Privileges or Immunities Clause does protect] were of any
great concern to the majority of freedmen.”); Rogers M. Smith.
Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S.History
(Yale, 1997), 333 (“[T]he majority had to know that the ruling’s
stress on states’ powers might also mean deference to efforts to
preserve or rebuild the old racial status quo.”); and R.
Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal
Courts, Department of Justice and Civil Rights, 1866-1876, at
155-59 (New York: Oceana, 1985) and “The Chase Court And
Fundamental Rights: A Watershed In American Constitutionalism,”
21 N. Ky. L. Rev. 151-191. Scholars’ willingness to read
Slaughterhouse as the beginning of a national backtracking on
Reconstruction, even though no blacks and no racial issues were
involved in the case, may be fueled by the fact that 1873 was
the same year that Grant began pardoning persons who had pled
guilty in the South Carolina KKK trials. Kermit Hall, "Political
Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux
Klan Trials, 1871-1872," Emory Law Journal 33 (1984):921-951.
16

17

Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (10 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873).

As to Miller himself, his biographer Charles Fairman cites
evidence from private letters that demonstrate that at least in
the 1866-1869 period, Miller sincerely (albeit
unenthusiastically) supported the Fourteenth Amendment as a
necessary check on (1)Southerners unrestrainedly violent
expressions of “fiendish hatred for the Negro” by attacks on
“the negro and Union white man” in such massacres as took place
in Memphis and New Orleans in 1866 and (2)on the Black Codes
that virtually reinstated slavery. Charles Fairman, Mr.Justice
Miller and the Supreme Court 1862-1890 (Cambridge, Harvard
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emptying all force from the Privileges and Immunities Clause would hurt rather
than help blacks?
4. And if he was sincere in his Slaughterhouse depiction of the core purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment, how can this reading possibly be made
compatible with his and the Court’s votes to set free on legal technicalities the
vicious murderers of multiple Southern black victims in such decisions as Blyew v.
U.S. (1872), U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876) and U.S. v. Harris (1883)?18

university Press, 1939) 191-192, citing letters of 1866 and
1869. The 1866 letter is unquestionably misdated by Fairman at
February 11, 1866, because the massacres in question took place
in early May and at the end of July of that year. Foner, supra
note 15, 261-3. His more recent biographer, Michael Ross, also
treats the expressed concern for protecting the rights of
freedmen as sincere, noting that the legislature whose statute
the Miller majority was upholding was a legislature that
contained a notoriously sizable percentage of blacks. Michael
Ross, Justice of Shattered Dreams: Samuel Freeman Miller and the
Supreme Court during the Civil War Era (Baton Rouge: LSU Press,
2003), pp. 201, 202, and generally ch.8.
18

Blyew v. U.S., 80 U.S 581 (1872); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1876); U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). The only
scholars I have encountered who take seriously this question are
Michael Ross, id., and Michael Les Benedict, “Preserving
Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court,” 1978 Supreme
Court Review 39-79 (arguing that the commitment to
Reconstruction by the Chase and the Waite Courts has been
underestimated by scholars and that it differed significantly
from that of the truly anti-Reconstruction Fuller Court).
Ross’s analysis of Justice Miller’s views on Reconstruction
closely parallels that of Benedict.
In that this essay too attempts to take seriously that the
Waite Court may have been sincere in developing a reading of the
Thirteenth through Fifteenth Amendments that would protect the
civil rights of blacks while honoring states’ rights, Benedict’s
and Ross’s analyses are compatible with this one. This essay
goes beyond their analyses, however, both in attempting to
locate a specific contextual reason for the Court’s rejection of
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This essay sketches out a re-reading of the Slaughterhouse decision in such
a way as to make sense of these controversies.19 In doing so, it pays heed to the
cases immediately before and after the Slaughterhouse decision--cases from
the decade of the 1870s: Circuit Court case U.S. v. Hall (1871), decided by laterto-be-Justice Woods;20 the KKK cases of 1871-2, which the Supreme Court

incorporation of the Bill of Rights in Slaughterhouse and in
focusing on the Guaranty Clause reasoning of Cruikshank to
demonstrate that the decision is not so anti-Reconstruction as
its concrete results cause it to appear.
19

There are two additional controversies that I do not address
here: (A) Was the law at issue, which established a stateregulated butchering monopoly, a product (to a greater degree
than usual) of bribery and corruption, or was it a legitimate
public health measure? Scholars as distinguished as Robert F.
Cushman have suggested the former. Cases in Constitutional
Liberties (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979, 20. Labbé
and Lurie’s recent book on the decision concludes persuasively
that the legislation was a normal public health measure,
responding to concerns well-documented in the legislative
record, and that the corruption image that has haunted the
legislation was in large part attributable to racist reaction to
the fact the Louisiana legislature contained thirty elected
black representatives. Ronald M. Labbé and Jonathan Lurie, The
Slaughterhouse Cases: Regulation, Reconstruction, and the
Fourteenth Amendment (Univ. Press of Kansas, 2003), Ch. 1-4.
(B) A second long-controverted aspect of Slaughterhouse goes as
follows: If incorporation of the personal liberties of the first
eight amendments was the correct reading of the Privileges or
Immunities clause, how does one explain the apparent redundancy
between the 5th and 14th Amendment due process clauses? Scholars
(see list of them in Wildenthal, supra n.11, at n.272) have
satisfactorily answered this with the explanation that the 39th
Congress understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to
protect specifically U.S. citizens, while the 14th Amendment due
process clause then extended this particular fundamental
protection to all persons as against the state governments.
20

26 F.Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871). Judge Woods there, having
consulted Justice Bradley by mail, followed Bradley’s advice to
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avoided deciding on the merits,21 Blyew v. U.S. (1872) and the nearly unanimous
U.S. v. Cruikshank decision of 1876, where the Court directly rejected a claim
that state failure to protect First or Second Amendment rights enabled the
federal government to secure these rights against private violence.22 It also
pays heed to the prevalence in the South of violence perpetrated by armed
read the First Amendment free speech and assembly rights as
having been incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment privileges or immunities clause, and to treat state
inaction to protect these rights for blacks as grounds for
federal intervention under the equal protection clause (both
arguments at 81). Woods joined the U.S. Supreme Court in 1880.
Frank Scaturro, The Supreme Court’s Retreat from Reconstruction
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 28; Lou Falkner Williams,
The Great South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press), 131. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The
Nationalization of Civil Rights; Constitutional Theory and
Practice in a Racist Society 1866-1883 (New York: Garland Press,
1987), 210-252.
21

U.S. v. James W. Avery, 13 Wall. 251 (1872); Ex Parte
Jefferson Greer, Sup. Ct. App. Case Files No.6200 (1872) U.S. v.
Elija Sapaugh, Sup. Ct. App. Case Files No. 6482. The Supreme
Court refused to decide Avery on the grounds that the decision
of these issues was properly within the jurisdiction of the
lower court; it refused even to grant a writ of habeas corpus in
the Greer case; and the U.S. Attorney General George Williams
forced the District Attorney Daniel Corbin to drop the Sapaugh
case with a nolle prosequi. Lou Falkner Williams, id. 100-112.

22

There are in the same decade two Seventh Amendment cases-Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874) and Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876)--where the Court unanimously refused
incorporation of the right to jury for civil cases, and a Second
Amendment case -- Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267-8
(1878)-- where the Court did the same as to the right to bear
arms. These buttress the reading of Slaughterhouse and
Cruikshank as rejecting incorporation. Interestingly, the
(losing) attorney in the Presser case, who argued that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms did apply against the state
government of Ohio, was Senator Lyman Trumbull.
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white mobs, the widespread awareness that the Fourteenth Amendment was
intended, inter alia, to undo the Dred Scott decision;23 and to the fact that the
Supreme Court in certain important cases in the 1880s did uphold the rights of
blacks against both state and private interference. 24 Had the Court majority
been simply anti-Reconstruction,25 it need not have moved in this latter
direction.
The argument here treats as settled the scholarly case that the intent of
the 39th Congress was to incorporate the personal rights of the first eight
amendments (along with other rights mentioned in the national Constitution
such as habeas corpus) into the Bill of Rights, 26 and that this fact is something
that would have been known to the justices in 1873.27 The following is a sketch
of how the Slaughterhouse majority opinion of Justice Miller might be most
plausibly understood.
I. Providing a Motive for Slaughterhouse
23

60 U.S. 393 (1857).

24

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), Ex Parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 350
(1880), Ex Parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).

25

Cf. Richard L. Aynes, “Constricting” supra note 6;
Kaczorowski, supra note 20; Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals supra
note 15, pp. 327-337.
26

The “fundamental rights” reading of Charles Fairman would not
alter the analysis here (see note 6 supra). Miller’s opinion
would still need explaining, because he read the clause as
adding NO new rights to be protected from state abridgment.

27

See note 3 supra.
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Those scholars who attempt to provide a motivation other than the
undermining of Reconstruction for Miller’s Slaughterhouse undercutting of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause have not been able to explain away these
mysteries. John Ely, for instance, suggested that the language of the clause
itself “frightened” off the Miller majority. The seemingly limitless nature of the
phrase “privileges and immunities of citizens,” pushed Miller to cut the clause
down so small as to render it effectively “dead.”28 But surely, had the Court
wanted to, it could have referred back to Congressional debates and cited the
leading spokesmen for the Amendment as to its purpose of incorporating the Bill
of Rights and the rights of the 1866 Civil Rights Act against state governments.
This is a big list, but not a limitless one. (The Court could have done this while still
rejecting the butchers’ claim, since there were clearly some “reasonable”
grounds for the law the butchers challenged.)
Michael Les Benedict offers a thoughtful account that explains the
backing away from allowing any clout to the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
Slaughterhouse as part of a broad commitment on the part of both the Chase
and Waite courts to dual federalism (i.e., the view that a certain body of implicit
states’ rights function to check federal powers).29 He notes persuasively that this

28

29

Ely, supra note 6, pp.22-3.

Benedict, “Preserving Federalism,” supra note 18. Michael
Ross, supra note 17, ch.8, essentially endorses Benedict’s
account of the majority in Slaughterhouse as moved by federalism
concerns rather than any anti-Reconstruction animus, and also by

14
commitment to preserving an appropriately state-centered federal balance
was reiterated in Republican Party Platforms of the Civil War and post-bellum
periods and also in speeches in Congress on behalf of the postbellum
Amendments and the postbellum Civil Rights Acts.30 He illustrates the depth of
this judicial commitment with, among others, the unanimous decision of Lane
County v. Oregon (1868),31 for which the opinion was written by Chief Justice
Salmon Chase, the most prominently anti-slavery justice to serve on the Supreme
Court in the nineteenth century. This decision declared unconstitutional a
federal law making federal notes legal tender for all purposes, including the
payment of state taxes. A law of Oregon squarely conflicted, requiring that
taxes be paid in gold or silver coin. The U.S. Supreme Court struck down the
federal law.
The purpose of this essay is not to dispute that the accepted federal
balance of late nineteenth century America was far more state centric than at
present—indeed, there was not even a federal Justice Department until 1870.32
Nor is it to deny that Justice Miller in 1873 found the dissenters’ position in

Justice Miller’s interest in permitting legislative regulation
of the economy detailed in note 34 below.
30

Id., at 45, 47-53. See also Nelson, “Fourteenth Amendment”
supra note 6, at 64-90; Bogen, supra note 4, at 389-393.

31

32

74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868).

Robert Goldman, Reconstruction and Black Suffrage: Losing the
Vote in Reese and Cruikshank (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2001), 5.

15
Slaughterhouse to present a frighteningly radical upsetting of the federal
balance; he himself says as much.33 The argument here agrees with those
scholars who depict Justice Miller as not attempting in 1873 to block
Reconstruction, but goes further in that it attempts to explain why he and his
majority reached beyond the issues of the case to reject what they had to have
known to have been Congress' incorporationist intent.34
His most likely, this essay suggests, albeit heretofore unnoticed, motive was
a desire to avoid incorporating the Second Amendment against state
governments.35 By 1871 federal enforcement of Reconstruction was already

33

Slaughterhouse, at 78.

34

Of course, at a more obvious level, they were also rejecting
the dissenters’ concern with entrenching as “fundamental rights”
economic freedoms of property–holders against regulation
perceived by state government as promoting public well-being.
This aspect of the decision presents no mystery. Justice Miller
in a private letter of 1875 expressed frustration with having to
“contend with” fellow justices “who have been at the bar the
advocates for forty years of railroad companies and all the
forms of associated capital” in cases involving “such
interests.” “All their training,” he lamented, all their
feelings are from the start in favor of those who need no such
influence.” Fairman, Mr. Justice Miller, supra note 17, 374.

35

The argument here is not concerned with deciding whether the
Second Amendment right was a personal right to bear arms or a
right to bear arms as a member of an organized citizen militia.
Amar supra note 6 Bill of Rights argues that its meaning evolved
from 1789 (militia right of states) to the Civil War period
(when it was often discussed as an individual right of blacks
for self-defense). Stephen P. Halbrook supra note 3 insists
strenuously on the individual rights reading, and he marshals
much documentary evidence for it. In fact, in this postbellum
period, a good deal of the armed white violence against blacks
was perpetrated by Southern whites organized as nongovernmental

16
bound up with the incorporation question. Judge Woods on Circuit upheld a
prosecution under the Enforcement Act of 1870 for deprivation of the rights of
free speech and peaceable assembly via private white violence against
blacks.36 In two of the three KKK cases that the Supreme Court ducked in 1872,
Second Amendment incorporation had been an issue confronting the Court, in
the sense that private interference by whites with this right as to blacks had
been charged and the defense claimed that Second Amendment rights were
not incorporated at the state level. For the first of these KKK cases, the Court
would have examined the two sets of competing arguments from the judges
below on the topic, although the Court was ultimately persuaded by the
arguments of Attorney General George Williams to deny its own jurisdiction for
the case. By the time the second of the cases posing the issue reached the
Supreme Court, although the judges below had again issued competing rulings
on the question, the defense attorney John Ficken had dropped this issue from
his appeal.37

militias and sometimes claiming a Second Amendment membershipin-the-militia right. See infra note 45. Also the arming of
blacks in official state militias was so heatedly controversial
that the Republican governor of South Carolina caved to
political pressure from whites and literally disarmed his state
black militia. Foner, supra note 15, 438-9; see also Lou Falkner
Williams, supra note 20, 23-27.
36

37

See supra note 20.

It came to the Supreme Court as a question needing decision,
because of division on the issue between the two judges in the
court below, in the first request for review, U.S. v. James W.
Avery, 13 Wall. 251 (1872). This case had certified to the
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Much of the South was in a state of armed insurgency during the years
leading up to both the Slaughterhouse and the Cruikshank cases. The situation
that had led up to the KKK Cases involved such massive violence that the
federal government had placed nine counties under martial law. In 1872, when
the Court ducked the KKK cases, more than 1200 more Enforcement Act cases
still awaited trial; the crimes ranged from murder or conspiracy to murder, to
interference with First or Second Amendment rights, to interference with voting
rights.38 It makes sense to imagine that Southern Republican state governments
(of which there were only a few left by 1873)39 may have wished to enact some

Supreme Court two questions: (1) Could ordinary [state] crimes
be federally punished under the 1870 Enforcement Act if they
were committed in order to violate civil rights of former
slaves, and (2)could a private conspiracy to deprive blacks of
Second Amendment rights be federally punished under the
Enforcement Act? For the second of the cases that had originally
produced judicial division over the issue, U.S. v. Elija
Sapaugh, the Justice Department removed it from the Supreme
Court’s docket by nolle prosequi. Lou Falkner Williams supra
note 20, at 100-102, 110-112.
38

39

Williams, id., 123.

By 1873 Republicans had lost their firm control of all
Southern states except Arkansas, Louisiana, Missippi, and South
Carolina. Tennessee, Georgia and Virginia had gone into the
control of the Democrats, and Alabama, Florida, North Carolina
and Texas had divided government. In the 1874 election
following the 1873 depression, with Democrats openly wielding
the race card, Democrats retook Texas, Arkansas, Florida,
Alabama, and Virginia. Foner, supra note 15, 539-553. They took
Mississippi in 1874-1875 in a campaign marked by rampant mob
violence perpetrated by armed bands of whites in broad daylight.
Id., 558-563. By the time of the March 1876 Cruikshank decision
only Louisiana and South Carolina were still under Republican
control -- (like Mississippi, they were majority black)-- but
Louisiana was the scene of repeated, disputed electoral
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sort of restrictions on the "keep[ing] and bear[ing of] arms" by non-members of
the official militia.
The armed insurgency of the white South continued in the years between
Slaughterhouse and the Court’s specific rejection of Second Amendment
incorporation in Cruikshank. In Arkansas in 1874 a series of armed “skirmishes”
ensued between competing self-proclaimed militias, each backing rival
claimants of victory in the disputed legislative and gubernatorial elections of
1872. The armed conflicts continued until President Grant intervened in May of
1874. In Louisiana, according to historian Eric Foner, “Every election between
1868 and 1876 was marked by rampant violence.” In Alabama in August, 1874
two Republican county leaders were assassinated; mobs destroyed homes and
crops of black people, murdered one person guarding a ballot box and burned
the ballot box; and Klan-type groups instituted a “reign of terror,” openly firing
upon unarmed blacks headed for ballot boxes, killing seven and wounding
dozens, and by public threats of armed force driving away from the polls
numberless others. In Mississippi, bands of armed whites kept blacks from the
polls in 1874 in Vicksburg and drove the black sheriff out of town. When a posse
of armed blacks showed up from the state capital, their pistols and shotguns
proved no match for the long-range rifles of the white forces. By early January
of 1875, when President Grant intervened with federal troops, as many as 300
outcomes, where, according to Eric Foner, “every election
between 1868 and 1876 was marked by rampant violence and
pervasive fraud.” Id., 550.
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blacks had been murdered.40 U.S. v. Cruikshank was argued at the Court in midJanuary, less than two weeks later (although the Court would hold its decision
for more than a year.)
A year before Slaughterhouse was handed down but after lawyers had
already argued the case,41 the Supreme Court did decide one case on the
merits that involved Southern anti-black violence. Blyew v. U.S.42 would have
impressed upon the Court not only the viciousness with which some Southern
whites were attacking their black neighbors but also the feebleness of the
federal government as a national policing system for dealing with such violence.
This case concerned an exceptionally brutal ax murder by two white men of a
black family, including a blind 97-year old grandmother, both parents, one nonhidden daughter, and a son who had been left for dead, but who lived long
enough to give eyewitness testimony under oath. One daughter who had
hidden from the attackers also was able to give eyewitness testimony.43
Because Kentucky law prohibited blacks from testifying against whites, the case
was removed to federal court under § 3 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which
provided,
“That the district courts of the United States, within their respective districts,
40

Foner, supra note 15, 528, 550, 552-553, 557-558.

41

Robert D. Goldstein, “Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional
Theme,” 41 Stan. L. Rev. 469-566, at n.221.

42

80 U.S. 581 (1872).

43

Robert D. Goldstein, “Blyew” supra note 41.
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shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes
and offences committed against the provisions of this act, and also, concurrently
with the circuit courts of the United States, of all causes, civil and criminal,
affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial
tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to
them by the first section of this act” [Ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (emphasis added) .]
The first section of the act had plainly specified that black citizens now
must have the same "right . . . to … give evidence” as white persons. Defense
counsel pointed out to the Court that to interpret witnesses in a criminal case as
persons being “affect[ed]” by “the cause” would render all laws in Kentucky
unenforceable due to judicial backlogs, because any person charged with a
crime could then insist on use of a black witness and therefore removal to
federal court, and there existed only two federal courts to serve the entire state.
The Supreme Court chose to interpret persons affected by the “cause” in
criminal cases to be only the prosecutor and the accused and threw the case
out of federal court. Blyew was then indicted in state court but fled from the
authorities before he could be convicted.44
And shortly before the Court handed down the Slaughterhouse decision,
the much-publicized Colfax massacre took place. (This massacre eventually
was to bring its perpetrators before the Court in U.S. v. Cruikshank, 1876, where
the Court would finally have to confront, and would squarely reject, a Second
44

Id. at 563
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Amendment incorporation claim). The Louisiana situation in the month
preceding the massacre had been as follows: A dispute over electoral results
led to armed conflict in New Orleans in March of 1873 between the official
(Republican-supported) black militia and a competing, purportedly official
white militia headed by the losing gubernatorial candidate. The official militia
successfully fought them off without serious casualties, but the following month
the Colfax massacre perpetrated by a similarly organized group of whites took
place in Grant parish, producing the deaths of somewhere between one and
four hundred blacks and the arrests that culminated in U.S. v. Cruikshank. TWO
DAYS LATER THE COURT HANDED DOWN THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE DECISION (on
April 14). The Crescent City White League then formed, organizing, among other
things, the assassination of six Republican officials. On September 14, 3,500
Leaguers (many of them Confederate Army vets) overwhelmed similar numbers
of blacks organized as militiamen and the Metropolitan Police of New Orleans.
They occupied the statehouse, city hall and arsenal and withdrew only in the
face of federal troops ordered there by President Grant.45
Apart from the ongoing use of federal troops and federal prosecutions to

45

Foner, supra note 15, 550-551. As part of their defense when
arrested, these White Leaguers relied on their Second Amendment
right to bear arms as the true citizen militia of Louisiana.
Carole Emberton, “The Limits of Incorporation: Violence, Gun
Rights, and Gun Regulation in the Reconstruction South,"
presented at Conference “Gun Control: Old Problems, New
Paradigms,” Stanford Law School, Sept.16-17, 2005. Forthcoming
Stanford Law and Policy Review.
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stem race-based slaughter in the South at the time of the Slaughterhouse
decision, several Southern states under Republican leadership had in recent
years found it necessary to implement widespread martial law or martial law-like
proceedings.46
It is thus plausible that Miller understood himself in Slaughterhouse, to be
(1)avoiding the shoals of Bill of Rights incorporation which could have hampered
state ability to deal with armed violence, but yet (2)still reading the Fourteenth
Amendment in a way protective of the newly granted civil rights of blacks
(pushed through Congress by his own party). This reading fits (a)his background
as a Republican, who had been motivated to join the party and to change
state of residence due to his hostility to slavery and (b) his privately expressed
belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was needed to protect blacks from the
mad violence of Southern white mobs.47 It also fits (c) the fact that the
Slaughterhouse majority was 4/5 Republican, and (d) the fact that the Court did
uphold black rights in three jury trial cases of 188048 and upheld federal
enforcement against private criminal action interfering with black voting in Ex
Parte Yarborough in 1884.49 It also fits (d) Miller's description of the three

46

Eric Foner cites Tennessee, Arkansas, North Carolina and Texas
in this regard for the period of 1868-1870. Id., 439-441.

47

See supra note 17.

48

See supra note 24.

49

Id.
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amendments as meant to protect the blacks from oppressions common at the
time,50 which does not strike one as an anti-Reconstruction message.
Slaughterhouse treats the generality of Corfield v. Coryell51 fundamental
rights of free-persons-in-a-free-society (understood as civil rights of state
citizenship) to be (as Justice Washington had said in Corfield) amenable to
reasonable restrictions at the state level that were up to each state, but (just as
Corfield had said in effect, "However you restrict them, they have to be alike as
to out-of staters") Miller reads the Fourteenth Amendment to say, “However you
states restrict these rights, they have to be alike as to the two races, black and
white, or as to the two peoples, the former enslavers and the former slaves.” The
latter version explains the link to the Thirteenth Amendment and would allow
Congress to enforce the basic civil rights against private violence, as long as a
race-based animus or pattern were alleged. This rule of non-discrimination as to
basic rights is what Congress sought to accomplish in the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
and what it then entrenched (per Miller of the Slaughterhouse opinion) in the
Equal Protection (not the Privileges or Immunities) Clause.
My reading is influenced by a couple of generally neglected passages in
the Court opinion for Cruikshank that (a) flatly reject incorporation of the
Second Amendment, as well as of the First Amendment; (b)that suggest that if
RACE discrimination had been in the indictment, this fact would have made a
50

See supra note 16.

51

4 Wash.C.C. 371, F. Cases No. 3,230 (Cir.Ct.E.D.Pa., 1823).
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legal difference (I read this passage as suggesting that in such event
interference with the equal protection required in a republican form of
government would trigger the legitimacy of Congressional intervention); and
that (c) suggest to Congress not terribly subtly that it might justify its federal
enforcement on the republican form of government clause which would then
not require a state action component. The Fourteenth Amendment
constitutionally entrenched the declaration from §1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
that all persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens. The
Cruikshank ruling appears to indicate that in a republican form of government
second class status among citizens is not permitted. Miller does not write
Cruikshank but he silently concurs as does Bradley, who had notably omitted the
Second Amendment from his incorporation list in his Slaughterhouse dissent.52
If all this is correct, did the Miller majority knowingly turn the Privileges or
Immunities Clause into a nullity in rejecting incorporation in the SlaughterhouseCruikshank combo? No. If I am right and they saw the granting of STATE
citizenship in the Fourteenth as the granting of basic civil rights to blacks,
protected from state race-based infringement by the Equal Protection Clause
(which then, like the 1866 act, forbids race-based discrimination but does not
allow for a complete federal take-over of defining the basic rights of citizens),
what did they make of the Privileges or Immunities Clause? As the first sentence
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83 U.S. 36, dissenting at 111, listing rights from Bill of
Rights at 118-119.
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of the Fourteenth gives state citizenship to blacks and the Equal Protection
Clause enforces it as to blacks, so the rest of the first sentence gives national
citizenship to blacks and the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects them in the
attendant rights. What did it protect? It protected just what the Dred Scott53
decision had denied. Dred Scott had said blacks, even if citizens of a state,
could not be national citizens in the sense of having constitutional rights to
invoke the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Privileges
or Immunities Clause says states may not insist that their state citizens somehow
differ among themselves or are otherwise restricted in their access to the
privileges or immunities of national citizenship, such as access to the federal
courts. It is true that one might have thought the supremacy clause ALREADY
denied states such a power, once the first sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment made blacks citizens, but the Dred Scott ruling had specifically
rejected access to federal courts by all persons of African descent. Under Dred
Scott a suit by a black citizen of Massachusetts against a black citizen of New
Hampshire, could not be taken up in federal court under diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction. In short, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, like the first sentence of
the Fourteenth Amendment is being read by the Slaughterhouse majority as a
response to the Dred Scott holding.
II. What is the Evidence?
A. Circumstantial
53

60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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My evidence for the Second Amendment motivation of the Miller group in
Slaughterhouse is basically circumstantial, the circumstances being (1)the
prevalence of armed violence in the South,54 (2)the Court’s prior unofficial
confrontation with the Second Amendment issue, unofficially in the KKK cases in
1871-1872, which would have made the matter salient for them, (3)and the fact
that it was white Southern Democrat Congressmen (not the pro-Reconstruction
northern Republicans) were the ones in the immediate wake of the
Slaughterhouse decision who touted the incorporation intent of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.55 To them the right to bear arms would have protected the
weapons of white vigilante groups, by this point very prominently active
throughout the South, the very groups whom the Miller majority might now be
worried about shielding.
There is additional circumstantial evidence that the Miller majority in
Slaughterhouse had reason to be concerned about the Second Amendment
consequences of incorporation. The KKK cases occupied not only the executive
and judicial branches of government. From April 1871 through February 1872,
Congress was engaged in hearing testimony before a Joint Select Committee to
investigate Klan violence. The amount of testimony was so massive that the
Committee published thirteen volumes on it; the Committee’s Majority and
Minority Report comprised the first volume of the set, and the other twelve
54

See supra text at nn. 38-46.
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Wildenthal, supra n.11, 1108 and Section III-A.
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volumes were transcripts of testimony. The Majority Report prominently featured
Klan activity aimed at disarming Southern blacks, even former Union soldiers, as
part of the effort to uphold the traditions of slavery. The Minority (i.e. Democratic
Party) Report was replete with claims of the wrongfulness of arming black militias
(who allegedly caused trouble) while disarming white militias. “[T]he white men
are denied the right to bear arms or to organize, even as militia, for the
protection of their homes….” Discussion of Klan attacks aimed at disarming
blacks featured prominently in the other twelve volumes.56 In President Grant’s
message to the House of April 1872 reporting on his enforcement of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, he explained that the nine counties of South Carolina had
been put under martial law in order to check the Klans, whose objects were “by
force and terror to prevent all political action not in accord with [their own]…, to
deprive colored citizens of the right to bear arms and of the right to a free
ballot, to suppress schools in which the colored citizens were taught, and to
reduce [them]…to a condition closely akin to that of slavery….”57
In sum, my evidence undergirding the supposition that Miller’s
Slaughterhouse five were reading the Constitution in such a way as to channel
rather than undo Reconstruction is partly circumstantial: (1) It fits their likely
Second Amendment concerns--concerns made salient by the rampant level of
Southern armed violence; by discussions of the right to bear arms in
56

Halbrook, supra note 3, 145-148.
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Id., 148-152.
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Congressional testimony, commentary and reports; by discussion of the right in
federal KKK prosecutions and in the President’s report on them; and by the
Court’s having been presented with this issue in the first of the KKK cases. (2)It
also is compatible with the Court’s later rulings in Strauder, Neal, Ex parte Virginia
and Ex Parte Yarborough.58
This Slaughterhouse interpretation also, however, has textual evidence,
derived from a close reading of largely neglected passages from the Cruikshank
decision of 1876. The latter decision at first blush appears to be a direct assault
on Reconstruction, since it threw out indictments of convicted white murderers
of blacks, and (relying on the highly contestable argument of U.S. v. Reese59
issued the same day) threw out two sections of the Enforcement Act of May
1870 as unconstitutional, due to the way they were drafted (saying “as
aforesaid,” instead of spelling out “on the basis of race or previous servitude”).60
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See supra note 24.
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92 U.S. 214 (1876).
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Congress within four days of the Reese declaration of
unconstitutionality began discussing whether and how to revise
Sections 3 and 4 of the May 31 1870 Enforcement Act. The
discussion arose in the context of a resolution by Sen.Morton
(GOP Indiana) and Sen.Christiancy (GOP Michigan) to investigate
the degree of “force, fraud, and intimidation” against black
voters present in the Mississippi election of 1875, and to
propose appropriate legislation to deal with and prevent such
problems. The resolution had been around since December, 1875,
four months before Cruikshank and Reese were handed down, but
now Sen. Bayard (Dem. Delaware) was arguing that the two Supreme
Court decisions showed that “the letter and spirit” of the
various Reconstruction enforcement acts were all
unconstitutional, and therefore no new legislation could be

29
(In the 1883 U.S. v. Harris decision the Court would throw out §5519 of the
adopted either. Republican Senators contested his (extreme)
claim that all the Fourteenth and Fifteen Amendments did was to
forbid state legislation, and only courts could enforce the
amendments by striking down such legislation (and, implicitly
therefore, that Congress’s only legislative role would be to lay
out appropriate jurisdiction for such declarations.) Sen.
Frelinghuysen of New Jersey noted correctly that all Congress
would have to do to render Sections 3 and 4 constitutional in
the eyes of the Supreme Court was to add the six words, “on
account of race or color.” The proposal for legislative
initiatives to clarify the 1870 Enforcement Act went nowhere
because the House of Representatives was now heavily Democrat.
Cong. Record 44th Cong. 1st Session, Vol.4 (Washington: Govt.
Printing Office, 1876) pp. 2064-2076, 2100-2107, 2108-2120,
5274-5298. Frelinghuysen comment at 2112.
Congress in 1873-4 had produced a recodification of federal
laws, and this recodification slightly altered the wording of
Sections 3 and 4, such that they would have now been even more
objectionable to the Waite Court (in that they removed the
references to racial motivation for interference with voting
rights that had previously been in the sections in the phrase
“as aforesaid” (which the Waite majority had found too vague to
suffice as indication that the crimes must include proof of
racial motivation). Now those sections contained no such
qualifying term. Congress then produced a Second Edition of the
Revised Statutes in 1878. In this edition the original §2 of
1870 became in the Revised Statutes partly §2005 and partly
§2006; Section 3 became partly §2007, partly §2008; Section 4
became partly §2006 and partly §5506; Section 5 became §5507.
Section 5506 was adopted March 3, 1875 (a year prior to the
Reese and Cruikshank decisions), as an amended version of §4 of
the 1870 Act. The amendment omitted the “as aforesaid”
language, as noted above. U.S. Statutes at Large, Revised
Statutes of the United States, Second Edition (Volume 18, Part
One) (Washington D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1878) Titles XXVI,
pp. 352-353 and LXX, ch.7, p.1067. Sections 5506 and 5507
remained part of the U.S. Code until they were repealed in 1893.
U.S. Code Service Tables, L.Ed. (Lexis-Nexis, 2004).
In sum, the divided Congress’s response to Reese/Cruikshank
was neither to amend the sections to meet the Court’s
objections, nor to remove them from the statute books. Cf.
Robert M. Goldman, supra note 32, at 109 (asserting, apparently
erroneously, that Congress promptly re-drafted the sections to
meet the Court’s concerns and re-enacted them as sections 5506
and 5507 of the Revised Statutes).
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Revised Statutes on similar grounds: by neglecting to mention racial motivation
or effect this piece of legislation fell out from under the Thirteenth Amendment’s
authorizing power to Congress.61
B Textual Evidence from U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876)
Nonetheless, certain passages in Chief Justice Waite’s Cruikshank decision
that discuss incorporation can also plausibly be read as a guidebook to
Congress and the federal executive on how constitutionally to uphold the rights
of blacks in the South, as to First Amendment rights and voting rights. These
concerns would have played to the pragmatic as well as the principled side of
the Republican Party. To the degree that Southern violence could succeed in
violently suppressing Republican party gatherings and the votes of Southern
blacks (by far the most solid Republican voting bloc), the Republican national
majority would be threatened. Indeed this majority was hanging by a thread at
the time of the March 1876 Cruikshank decision, having lost the House
overwhelmingly and most Southern state legislatures in the 1874 election.62
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U.S. v. Harris 106 U.S. 629 (1883), at 639-643. Nor could the
Guaranty Clause authorize §5519 (the Court implied), since it
applied “no matter how well the State may have performed its
duty” (at 639).
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By 1873 Republicans had lost their firm control of all
Southern states except Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
South Carolina. Tennessee, Georgia and Virginia had gone into
the control of the Democrats, and Alabama, Florida, North
Carolina and Texas had divided government. In the 1874 election
following the 1873 depression, with Democrats openly wielding
the race card, Democrats retook legislatures in Texas, Arkansas,
Florida, and Alabama. Foner, supra note 15, 539-553. At the
national level, the landslide 1874 election had been devastating
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Michael McConnell has described the election season of 1876 as possibly the
“most violent, fraud-ridden, and tumultuous in history,” and has noted that
people were openly predicting another civil war over the election outcome.63
Although in the immediate short term the federal executive proceeded, after
the Hayes-Tilden election was settled, to stop using federal troops to protect
black rights in the South, Chief Justice Waite’s willingness expressed in the
Cruikshank reasoning, to allow federal prosecutions for violent private
interference with voting rights, as long as the indictments were more carefully
framed, was not lost on the federal government.64 The Republican

to the Republicans in Congress. Democrats went from having only
one-third of the House seats to having a majority of 169-109.
Michael McConnell “The Forgotten Constitutional Moment,”
Constitutional Commentary 11(1994):115-144, 125. Democrats
“redeemed” Mississippi in 1874-1875 in a campaign marked by
rampant mob violence perpetrated by armed bands of whites in
broad daylight. Foner, id., 558-563. By the 1876 Cruikshank
decision, only Louisiana and South Carolina (like Mississippi,
majority black) were still under Republican control -- but
Louisiana was the scene of repeated, disputed electoral
outcomes, where, according to Eric Foner, “every election
between 1868 and 1876 was marked by rampant violence and
pervasive fraud.” Foner, id., 550. In these two states and in
Florida, Republicans still controlled the governorship. Id.,
575.
63

64

Michael McConnell, id. 127-8.

Chief Justice Waite himself almost immediately after
Cruikshank displayed his willingness in this direction by
upholding indictments against South Carolina whites charged with
violent interference with black voting rights during the 1876
campaign. Donald G. Nieman, Promises to Keep: African Americans
and the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present (Oxford
University Press, 1991), 99. According to Charles Fairman,
Southern Democrats in the Senate were expressing “general
unfriendliness to the federal judiciary” in January of 1882, Mr.
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administration did pick up on his Cruikshank advice for the Ex Parte Yarborough
prosecutions of perpetrators of violence during the 1882 congressional elections.
Second Amendment rights were another story. Talk of their incorporation was
buried for good in the Cruikshank decision.
In terms of Republican party principles, Chief Justice Waite’s turn in
Cruikshank to the clause guarantying a republican form of government (Art. IV,
Sec.4) as the grounding for federal enforcement of black civil rights against
private violence had impeccable credentials. The link between “essential
principles of republican government” and the protection (entrenched in the
Fourteenth Amendment) of a distinct “portion of the population” to whom a
state “systematically refuses or neglects to [give] protection” was elaborated by
no less mainstream an authority than Thomas M. Cooley in his widely consulted
edition of Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution.65 Chief Justice Salmon
Chase himself (Mr. Anti-slavery among the nineteenth century justices) had
penned the unanimous opinion in Texas v. White to uphold Congressional
Reconstruction as authorized by the Guaranty Clause.66

Justice Miller, supra note 17. One can infer that if the
federal courts had been undermining Reconstruction, southern
Democrats seemed not to have noticed it.
65

Thomas M. Cooley, ed. Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, Vol.II, 4th ed. (Boston,
1873),ch.XLVII, pp.682-685, as cited in Kaczorowski,
Nationalization of Civil Rights, supra note 20, p.290 at n.80.
66

Texas v. White, 7 U.S. 700, at 728-730 (1869) says the
following:
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There are four separate lines of constitutional reasoning used in
Cruikshank. First, the Court rejects the four of the sixteen counts of the
indictments (6th, 7th, 14th, and 15th) concerning interference with the right to vote
because no racial motivation of the perpetrators was alleged. The Fifteenth
Amendment forbade racial discrimination in voting but did not guarantee
voting as such. Although the words of the Fifteenth Amendment forbid racebased denials or race-based abridgment of the vote “by the United States, or
by any state,” the Waite court was prepared to allow federal protection of the
vote even against private racially-motivated violence, as long as the racial
motivation was in the charge and was proved.67
The three remaining lines of argument in Cruikshank are tightly interwoven.
They all appear at pages 92 U.S., 551-555 of the opinion; I disentangle them
“The new freemen necessarily became part of the people; and the
people still constituted the State: for States, like
individuals, retain their identity, though changed, to some
extent, in their constituent elements. And it was the State,
thus constituted, which was now entitled to the benefit of the
constitutional guaranty.
“In the exercise of the power conferred by the guaranty
clause, as in the exercise of every other constitutional power,
a discretion in the choice of means is necessarily allowed. It
is essential only that the means must be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the power conferred, through the
restoration of the State to its constitutional relations, under
a republican form of government, and that no acts be done, and
no authority exerted, which is either prohibited or unsanctioned
by the Constitution….
“[T]he power to carry into effect the clause of guaranty is
primarily a legislative power, and resides in Congress…”
67

This is a point stressed in Benedict “Preserving Federalism,”
supra note 18.
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here, but if the reader would like to see how Chief Justice Waite intertwines
them, I reproduce an extended passage containing them in the Appendix.
Waite’s second line of argument rejects the idea that First or Second
Amendment rights have been incorporated via wholesale incorporation of the
Bill of Rights through the Privileges or Immunities Clause against state
governments. The Second Amendment, he says [at 553], “has no other effect
than to restrict the powers of the federal government.” As to the First
Amendment, he distinguishes [at 552] between peaceably assembling for any
lawful purpose and assembling to “petition[] Congress for redress of grievance
or for any thing else connected with the … national government.” The latter is
[now] protected as “an attribute of national citizenship” “by the United States”
[at 552]. The former remains in the hands of the state police power. This section
of his opinion, then, recapitulates the Miller opinion in Slaughterhouse. But this
time, Bradley concurs silently. This rejection of incorporation, incidentally, breaks
with Justice Bradley’s circuit court rationale for the case. He had retained First
and Second Amendment incorporation, but had argued that private action
could not violate those rights; under the Fourteenth Amendment state action
was required for a violation of those rights.68
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Bradley’s argument that state action was needed for a
violation varied as to the right in question. When it came to a
racially motivated private conspiracy for preventing a black
person from leasing property, there Bradley insisted, “it cannot
be doubted that this would be a case within the power of
congress to remedy and redress.” U.S. v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas.
707, at 714. To this extent Bradley in 1874 was sticking with
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Thirdly, Waite [at 553-555] throws out those counts alleging interference
with either due process of law or equal protection of the law, on the grounds
that these Fourteenth Amendment clauses refer only to actions by states, not by
private persons. Neither clause “adds any thing to the rights which one citizen
has under the Constitution against another.” He is ruling out Congressional
enforcement of either the equal protection or the due process clauses against
private persons, as distinguished from states.
Then (fourthly), interspersed within his arguments both on the First
Amendment right to assemble peaceably for any lawful purpose and his
arguments on the right to be equally protected by the laws in one’s person and
property, Chief Justice Waite inserted several statements about the demands of
a republican form of government. For instance, he writes [at 552], “The very
idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
his 1871 advice to Judge Woods on the idea that state inaction
might justify federal intervention against private wrongdoing.
There is a Thirteenth Amendment logic for this position. The
Thirteenth made blacks free persons, and the right to earn, buy
and sell property is a fundamental right of free persons.
Congress is authorized to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.
Bradley had put forth this Thirteenth Amendment rationale in his
dissent (with Swayne) for the 1872 Blyew case. There he had
insisted that the Court should uphold a law that (per his
interpretation) “provides a remedy where the State refuses to
give one; where the mischief consists in inaction or refusal to
act, or refusal to give requisite relief,” because under the
Thirteenth Amendment, “The power to enforce the amendment by
appropriate legislation must be a power to do away with the
incidents and consequences of slavery, and to instate the
freedmen in the full enjoyment of that civil liberty and
equality which the abolition of slavery meant.” 80 U.S. 581, 597
and 601.
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citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to
petition for a redress of grievances.” He also writes [at 555], “The equality of the
rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. Every republican government is in
duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its
power.” (Emphasis added.)
While the conventional reading of this “if” phrase is to take “power” as a
reference to legitimate authority, as distinguished from effective capacity, in
fact Waite’s statement has close echoes not only in the Bradley lower court
opinion described above, but also in speeches made by stalwart supporters of
Reconstruction in the U.S.Senate, in an extended discussion of Reese and
Cruikshank that transpired within days of the decision. Whereas Chief Justice
Waite put the force of constitutional authorization in the republican form of
government clause in order to get around what he saw as the state action
limitations of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses, Senator Morton
placed the authorization in the Equal Protection clause and in the Fifteenth
Amendment, insisting,
“When a State government utterly fails to protect a large class of
her people, that is denying them the equal protection of the laws.
It is the duty of the State to protect every class of her population
and when a state fails to do it…it is denying equal protection of the
laws, and Congress can come in and furnish that protection. This
was the understanding with which both these [Fourteenth and
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Fifteenth] amendments were passed… and we all know it….[I]f the
State by its government failed to protect a part of her people, or if
she were unable to do it, if anarchy prevailed, that failure … of the
State [denies equal protection]. That was the understanding we
had of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments….and this whole
country knows it.”69
Chief Justice Waite pointedly adds to his equal protection discussion the
fact that, “There is no allegation that this [depriving others of equal benefit of
laws] was done because of race or color of the persons conspired against” [at
554]. If he were simply making the argument that Congress may not act to
enforce the equal protection clause unless there is unconstitutional state action
to restrain, there would have been no reason for him to add these passages. If
one takes the words seriously, one sees them pointing to a Congressional
rationale for punishing racially motivated attacks on persons and property, as
Justice Bradley’s circuit court opinion would have permitted under (evidently)
either the Thirteenth Amendment or some sort of combination of the citizenship
clause of the Fourteenth and the Privileges or Immunities clause of the
Fourteenth.70 But Justice Waite’s, and now the Supreme Court’s, rationale for
allowing this protection would be the republican form of government clause.
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(March 30, 1876).
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This implicit suggestion from Waite [at 554-555] was that Congress invoke its duty
to guaranty a republican form of government to the states (under Article IV, § 4)
in any situation where the state showed it not “within its power” to secure such
government. Such “republican” government, according to the Waite Court
included both the First Amendment right to petition government for redress of
grievance, and the same right for black persons as is enjoyed by white persons
“to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings” of the state “… for
the security of their respective persons and property.”
In my judgment the most sensible way to read this set of arguments is as
follows: (1) The Court is rejecting Second Amendment incorporation against
state governments; but (2) is inviting the federal government, if it again gets
mobilized in a pro-Reconstruction direction,71 to legislate to protect First
Amendment rights of assembly and political expression against private violence
71

. See note 62 supra. Notably, the Senate Committee appointed
five days after the Reese and Cruikshank decisions to
investigate the “force, fraud, and intimidation” against blacks
and their allies in the 1875 Mississippi election and to
recommend appropriate legislation to deal with the problem
picked up on Waite’s suggestion. The recommendation came in the
committee’s report on August 8, 1876, and grounded its
legislative recommendation not on the power to secure fifteenth
Amendment rights nor on the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause, but rather on the republican form of
government guarantee. “The United States has guaranteed to the
State of Mississippi a republican form of government, and this
guarantee must be made good.” Cong. Record Vol.4, pp.5280-5281.
The recommendation of laws to be passed came in the most general
of terms, and with the House controlled by Democrats, no more
concrete proposals to protect voting rights were put forth in
this Congress. But see note 60 supra for information on what
became of the federal code in this respect.
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as part of its power under the clause that assures that the United Sates will
guaranty a republican form of government to every state. This approach
eliminates the troublesome specter of Second Amendment incorporation,
allowing states to regulate to reduce gun violence, but protects those freedoms
mentioned in the First Amendment that are needed for a republican form of
government. It was also an approach with some familiarity. Republican
candidates had been invoking the clause regularly in campaign speeches in
defense of their Reconstruction policies in the 1867-1870 period.72 Discussion of
the clause figured prominently in the debates over readmission of Virginia and
Mississippi to the Union in February of 1870.73 Just three months later Congress
had enacted the first of the Ku Klux Klan Enforcement Acts, under which
Cruikshank and his criminal associates had been found guilty. And, as noted,
former Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase had used the clause to support the
constitutionality of Congressional Reconstruction in Texas v. White (1869).
(3) Finally, The Waite opinion for Cruikshank invites the federal
government to produce more particularly drawn indictments that specify racial
animus behind private violence or a pattern of non-enforcement of state laws
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for the protection of blacks as such. The Court implies that it will uphold such
indictments as proceeding (again) from the republican form of government
clause. Under this clause there would be no state action requirement as a
prerequisite to punishing private wrongs. Now that blacks have been freed by
the Thirteenth Amendment, they and their descendants are implicitly
guaranteed the basic rights of free persons in a free society (subject to
reasonable police power limits) and thus may not as a group be denied equal
protection of the laws, through state inaction. Such inaction would amount to a
state failure to provide a republican form of government and would make
federal intervention appropriate.
III. Conclusions
This essay has presented a far more Reconstruction-friendly reading of
Cruikshank than is typical.74 It is true that the specific outcome of Cruikshank by
setting free three white men who had murdered black people left the
impression that it was saying by deed what Dred Scott had said in words, that
the black man in this country had no rights that the white man was bound to
respect. Still, the Cruikshank court did go out of its way to point to avenues for
future legal redress for aggrieved blacks. And this is the only reading I can think
of that can account for (a) the majority of eight concurring in the reasoning—all
the Republicans on the Court including Bradley, the Slaughterhouse
incorporationist (my premise is that the Second Amendment issue caused him to
74
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back away from wholesale incorporation); (b) the extended language about
the requirements of a republican form of government, which is not needed to
settle the issues of the case; and (3) the language concerning a race-based
animus behind the violence. The absence of state action may in the eyes of the
Court make the Equal Protection Clause unavailable as the foundation of the
federal power to prosecute. Even if this is so, however, there is no reason for the
Court to mention the lack of a racial animus accusation, unless the Court is
planning to treat such an allegation as legitimating the federal power to
prosecute future cases under a different part of the Constitution. The Court is
pointing to the Guaranty Clause, as supplemented in the Thirteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, as that part.
Thus, it is a mistake to judge Cruikshank simply as part of the sign-off of
Reconstruction that occurred after the 1876 election when Hayes promised to
stop enforcing the rights of Southern blacks as the price by which he bought the
presidency in that disputed election. Cruikshank lets those three murderers go
free as the cost of assuring the country of what leading Republican spokesmen
had been saying since the war’s end--the Republican party did not plan or wish
to license the federal government to supplant state governments as the basic
law enforcers.75 Rather, the party line on the Thirteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments was that these simply empowered the federal government to
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secure these rights (of free persons and of voting) for the freed slaves.
Cruikshank continued to allow such federal enforcement as long as indictments
were carefully drawn.76 As to the Fourteenth Amendment, many in Congress
had insisted it would protect fundamental rights, or Bill of Rights privileges, of all
Americans from abridgment by state governments, but armed violence was so
prevalent in the South and Second Amendment rights so prominent in the
discourse of Bill of Rights protections, that the Supreme Court “interpreted” that
meaning out of the Privileges or immunities Clause. The Supreme Court has
never put that meaning back with respect to the Second Amendment, and
once Cruikshank squarely confronted Second Amendment incorporation
neither Justice Bradley nor Justice Woods, both of whom had earlier endorsed
Bill of Rights incorporation, abandoned the incorporation position.77 The reading
of the 1870s justices did not match Congress’s original intention as to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. But perhaps the Court’s was the wiser one, at
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that decisions like Cruikshank were followed by a drastic
reduction in federal enforcement efforts. But the electoral
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disentangling an independent impact from Supreme Court decisions
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least as to the Second Amendment.

